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Abstract
We exploit seating rules in the European Parliament to identify peer effects in legislative
voting. Sitting adjacently leads to a 7 percent reduction in the overall likelihood that two
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same party differ in their vote, but
peer effects are markedly stronger among women, among MEP pairs from the same country,
and in close votes. Using variation in seating across the two venues of the Parliament (Brussels
and Strasbourg), we also show that peer effects are persistent: MEPs who have sat together in
the past are less likely to disagree even when they are not seated adjacently.
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1 Introduction
A primary function of politicians is to pass legislation. Political scientists and economists have thus
long been interested in how legislation gains support. Lawmakers may be swayed by earmarks or
other benefits to themselves or their electorate. Or they may be cajoled, convinced, or subjected
to social pressure by their peers.
How big a role peer influence plays is an empirical matter, but one that is notoriously difficult to
resolve (Manski, 1993). In this paper, we exploit alphabetical seating in the European Parliament
to study peer effects among its members. Using flexible controls for name similarity, we instrument
for whether two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) sit next to each other based on their
alphabetical adjacency within the party.1 Our IV estimates indicate that sitting next to each other
reduces the probability that two MEPs from the same party differ in their vote by 0.6 percentage
points. This represents a 7 percent decline relative to the 8.55 percent average rate of within-party
disagreement and is about one-tenth of the size of the impact of being from the same country.
To buttress our identification approach, we use placebo tests that exploit the fact that party
leaders and members of four small parties do not sit alphabetically. Reassuringly, alphabetical
adjacency has no impact on voting congruence among these MEPs. As an additional check, we also
verify that once we condition on contemporaneous and past seating, future seat adjacency does not
predict current voting outcomes.
We also explore the mechanisms behind the observed peer effects by examining the influence
of present versus past adjacency, and by looking at heterogeneity in the magnitude of peer effects
across MEP-pair attributes and the importance of the proposal under consideration. In our first
set of analyses, we distinguish ‘contemporaneous’ peer effects — that operate while the pair is
seated together — from ‘persistent’ peer effects that remain even when the peer is not present.
The European Parliament convenes in two separate venues, in Brussels and Strasbourg, each with
a distinct seating chart. Differences across venues in the seating layout makes it possible for a
pair of alphabetically adjacent MEPs to sit together in one venue but not in the other. We find
that having sat together in Strasbourg during the previous session affects current session voting in
Brussels, even after accounting for (current) seating proximity in Brussels.2 These findings show
that peer effects contain a persistent component.
Turning to our analysis of heterogeneity in peer effects, we find that peer effects are much
stronger when the two MEPs are from the same home country or are both women. For these
1By “party,” we mean the European Political Group. We discuss the relevant institutional details in the next
section.
2And analogously, of course, having sat together in Brussels during the previous session affects voting in Strasbourg
today even after accounting for seating proximity in Strasbourg.
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groups, we estimate that seat adjacency reduces disagreement by about 1.3 percentage points,
corresponding to percentage declines in disagreement between 17 and 40 percent. These findings
suggest that peer exposure serves as a complement to having other shared attributes, such as country
of origin or gender — that facilitate social pressure or communication. Looking at subsamples of
proposals that passed by narrow margins, we find that peer effects are also stronger in close, high-
stakes votes. For example, in votes decided by a margin of 1 percent or less, seat adjacency reduces
disagreement by nearly 2 percentage points.
Political economy scholars have been interested in how legislators’ social connections affect
the legislative process going back as far as Routt (1938) and Truman (1956). This attention has
recently grown with increased interest in peer effects within political networks (see Lazer (2011)
for an overview). Most recently, Canen and Trebbi (2016) examine how peer effects influence
socialization and careers in the U.S. Congress, while Battaglini and Patacchini (2016) analyze how
social networks of legislators impact political contributions.
Despite this increased attention, existing evidence on peer effects in the legislative process is
limited. Masket (2008) shows that votes in the California Assembly are more similar for legislators
seated in adjacent desks but acknowledges that seating might have been assigned on the basis of
shared views.3 Cohen and Malloy (2014) find that logrolling (i.e., trading votes) in the U.S. Senate
is more widespread among members of the same alumni network. Two papers concurrent with our
own, Jo and Lowe (2017) and Saia (2017), both examine peer influence among Icelandic legislators,
also using exogenous variation in seating within the legislature. These papers focus on different
outcomes however. While we focus on concordance in votes cast, both Jo and Lowe (2017) and Saia
(2017) look at similarity of language in used in speeches given by parliamentarians. Saia (2017)
also looks at voting but focuses primarily on vote participation (the high degree of party discipline
in Iceland makes it difficult to examine vote concordance in this setting). Finally, Rogowski and
Sinclair (2012) take advantage of the office lottery for new Members of Congress to generate causal
estimates of office proximity on voting and bill co-sponsorship. While their point estimates are small
and the authors report that they “find no evidence that office proximity affects patterns of legislative
behavior,” their confidence intervals allow for large peer effects. For example, the data does not rule
out the possibility that having proximate offices has a bigger impact on cosponsoring legislation
than being in the same party. In contrast, we present positive results with tighter standard errors
and provide additional evidence on the mechanism behind the observed peer effects.
Two other features of our study warrant mention, relative to prior work. First, given the diverse
and heterogeneous composition of the European Parliament, our setting may be particularly well-
3Ringe et al. (2013) also study social networks in the European Parliament, but using a methodology that cannot
distinguish peer influence from correlated preferences.
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suited to studying how commonalities – gender and place of origin in particular – interact with
peer effects. Second, only Jo and Lowe (2017) shares with our work the analysis of the persistence
of peer effects, which helps to distinguish between short-term mimicry or social pressure versus
changed beliefs.
We also contribute to the broader literature on peer effects. A number of papers analyze political
peer effects among citizens: Nickerson (2008) uses a canvassing experiment to show intrahousehold
influence on turnout, while Perez-Truglia and Cruces (2016) and Perez-Truglia (2016) provide evi-
dence of peer effects in campaign donations using a combination of experimental and observational
data. DellaVigna et al. (2017) demonstrate the importance of social image concerns in voting.
Campos et al. (2013) exploit random assignment of Brazilian freshmen to classrooms to study the
impact of peers on political preferences and engagement. Holden et al. (2016) identify large peer
effects among U.S. Supreme Court Justices. Moving beyond politics, much of the well-identified
research on peer influence has focused on academic and workplace performance (e.g., Duflo et al.
(2011), Guryan et al. (2009), Herbst and Mas (2015), Mas and Moretti (2009), Sacerdote (2011), ).
2 Background and Data
2.1 The European Parliament
The European Parliament (EP) is the lower legislative chamber of the European Union (EU). Since
1979, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been selected via elections held in each EU
member country. While elections are thus conducted at the country level, once in the EP, MEPs
join one of several cross-national European Political Groups (EPGs) according to their political
leanings.4 Each EPG consists of MEPs from different countries and national parties. During the
day-to-day work of the EP, EPGs carry out many of the functions performed by parties in national
legislatures. In particular, EPGs sit together during voting sessions in the parliament and also
formulate a (non-binding) “party line” for many of the issues being voted on. Throughout, we will
use the terms “party” and “EPG” interchangeably.
The work of the EP is centered around the plenary sessions held once or twice a month in either
Strasbourg or Brussels. These sessions consist of several daily “sittings” of debate and voting.
Importantly for the present paper, for about a third of these votes, individual voting is registered
electronically, with MEPs casting ballots via electronic voting machines on their desks. To cast a
ballot, an MEP inserts an ID card into the voting machine and presses the button corresponding
to the desired choice.5 MEPs are not permitted to cast votes for each other. We know of only a
4There is a small number of MEPs who are not affiliated to any EPG.
5Historically, votes involving individual registration were held as roll-call votes, with the EP president calling on
4
single alleged case of an MEP voting on behalf of an absent colleague, when a Marcel de Graaff was
accused of casting ballots on behalf of fellow party member Marine Le Pen on October 28, 2015.
The actions of Le Pen and her colleague were quickly uncovered and sanctioned.
For each proposal with individual registration between October 2006 and November 2010, we
collected data on the vote cast by each MEP.6 These data contain information from 3,123,419 votes
cast by 1,261 distinct MEPs on 5,297 different proposals spread across 168 days of voting.
In both Strasbourg and Brussels, each MEP has an assigned seat within his or her EPG. We ob-
tained official EP seating charts covering October 2006 to November 2010 for Brussels and November
2006 to November 2010 for Strasbourg. For days when no seating chart was available, we assume
that seating was unchanged from the prior seating chart.7 To illustrate the nature of these data,
Figure 1 shows sample seating charts for the two venues. Within each chart, we label the EPG
(ALDE, VERTS/ALE, S&D, etc.) associated with each group of seats.8 Each number corresponds
to a seat and is mapped to a list of MEP names on a separate sheet.9
Finally, for each MEP, we have data on his or her age, tenure in the EP, and whether (s)he
holds a degree from a “top 500” university.10
2.2 Alphabetical seat assignment in the EP
Seat assignment in the EP takes place according to rules laid down by the body’s Conference of
Presidents. As noted above, MEPs from the same EPG sit together. Furthermore, within each EPG,
the party leadership sits in the first few rows in an otherwise unspecified manner. Importantly for
our purposes, however, EP rules dictate that seats for non-leadership MEPs be “generally allocated
each member to announce his vote in turn. As a result, votes involving individual registration are commonly referred
to as “roll-call” votes even today. However, since in practice voting is never sequential, we avoid using the term
“roll-call” here.
6Data on votes was collected from the European Parliament website,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/home.do?language=EN, between February 2007 and Octo-
ber 2010. There are a few MEPs for whom we cannot uniquely link their voting record to an MEP identifier on the
EP website. These are excluded from the data.
7This introduces some measurement error, as a small number of MEPs move around due to changes in party
leadership and MEP arrivals and departures.
8One small EPG in our data, “Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty,” was dissolved in the middle of the 6th
parliamentary term in November 2007. As most of its 25 members remained unaffiliated afterwards, we treat
membership in “Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty” as non-affiliated throughout our sample period.
9A dashed rectangle has been superimposed on each chart and we “zoom in” on these areas in Figure 3. We
discuss the importance of Figure 3 further below.
10This measure of education quality is more useful than education quantity in our sample because virtually every
MEP holds a college degree. To construct our measure, we identified where MEPs attended college from their
individual websites. We were able to obtain this information for nearly 90 percent of the sample. We merged these
data with the 2010 Academic Ranking of World Universities, which provides a ranking of the top 500 universities in
the world. Because the majority of MEPs (75 percent in our main sample) hold degrees from universities that have
not made it into the list at all, we only use information on whether MEPs’ hold any top 500 degree, rather than the
precise rank of their degree. See Fisman et al. (2015) for additional details.
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in alphabetical order” by last name, though the seating rules do allow for a member to “occasionally
occupy another place for organizational or technical reasons.”11 In our analysis, we wish to exploit
the quasi-random variation in seating generated by this alphabetical seating rule. Inspection of the
seating charts clearly shows that four small EPGs, as well as the group of unaffiliated members,
do not adhere to the alphabetical name assignment rule.12 Among the remaining six larger EPGs
(covering more than 80 percent of total MEPs in our data), the alphabetical assignment rule holds
for most MEPs. In these “alphabetical parties,” we observe a leadership section in the first few rows
where seat assignment is unrelated to name, after which there is a non-leader section where seat
assignment correlates strongly (but not perfectly) with the alphabetical ranking of last names.13
To illustrate the predictive power of alphabetical order on seat assignments, Figure 2 takes a
seating chart and plots within-party alphabetical rank against within-party seat number for two
different EPGs. In Panel A, we see that the “European United Left–Nordic Green Left” does not
adhere to the alphabetical seating rule: there is no relationship between alphabetical rank and seat
number for this group of MEPs. In Panel B, we plot the relationship for the “Greens–European
Free Alliance.” In the first handful of seats, alphabetical rank shows no relationship with seat
number. This corresponds to the leadership section, where seat assignments are not name-based.
Among the non-leaders from seat 9 onward, however, alphabetical rank is a very strong predictor
of seat number, as indicated by the nearly monotone relationship between the two variables. Note,
however, that compliance is not perfect, as the MEP in seat 42 sits out of alphabetical order.
Across all days, the correlation between within-party seat number and alphabetical rank is 0.95 in
the sample of non-leaders from alphabetically seated EPGs.
The non-leadership sections of the six alphabetically seated EPGs form the main analysis sample.
We use the leadership sections of these parties as well as the four non-alphabetically seated parties
for a placebo test. Table 1 provides a summary and compares the main sample to the two placebo
samples.
11See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sed/hemicycle.do (last accessed August 2, 2018).
12The four EPGs that do not adhere to the alphabetical seating rule are the European United Left–Nordic Green
Left, Independence-Democracy, Union for Europe of the Nations, and Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty.
13One additional exception to this description is the “Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe,” which seems
to use alphabetical seating in a part of its leadership section. We thus exclude this party’s leadership section from
the placebo exercise in Table 5.
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3 Empirical strategy and results
3.1 Empirical strategy
To explore whether MEPs that are placed next to each other tend to vote more similarly, we analyze
the voting concordance of MEP pairs. For each proposal and each EPG in our data, we form all
possible within-EPG pairs of MEPs in which both MEPs are present and participate in the vote.14
Letting ij index MEP pairs and t index proposal, we construct the variable Disagreeijt as an indi-
cator for whether MEPs i and j cast different votes on proposal t. We construct SeatNeighborsijt
to denote whether the MEP pair ij sat next to each other during proposal t.
A naive approach to estimating the treatment effect of sitting together on vote concordance
would be to compare the votes of MEP pairs who sit next to each other (treated observations) to
the votes of MEP pairs that do not (untreated observations) by simply regressing the outcome,
Disagreeijt, on the treatment indicator, SeatNeighborsijt:
Disagreeijt = β0 + β1SeatNeighborsijt + νijt. (1)
There are two concerns with interpreting the estimate of β1 as the causal impact of sitting
together on vote concordance. First, when MEPs choose whether to sit together, those who vote
alike may be more likely to sit together. Second, even among MEPs who follow the alphabetical
seating rule, the rule itself might induce MEPs who are more likely to vote alike to sit together
because, for example, individuals with more similar names tend to have more similar backgrounds.
To address the first issue, we restrict our attention to the non-leadership sections of the six
alphabetically seated EPGs and we use the seat assignment rule as an instrument for seating
adjacency. We define our main analysis sample to only include observations ijt where the pair
of MEPs ij are from an alphabetically seated EPG and where both MEPs are non-leaders at the
time when voting on proposal t took place. For this sample, we define NameAdjacentijt to be an
indicator variable which denotes whether MEP pair ij’s last names are adjacent in the alphabetical
ordering of names among the non-leaders in their EPG on the day when the vote on proposal t took
place. Table 2 provides summary statistics for this main analysis sample and all main variables.
With these sample and variable definitions, we can obtain an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate, γˆ1,
from the equation:
Disagreeijt = γ0 + γ1NameAdjacentijt + εijt. (2)
14MEPs can actively vote to abstain, although such votes are rare (less than four percent of votes cast). We treat
abstentions as non-participation.
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In addition, we can use NameAdjacentijt as an instrument for SeatNeighborsijt in Equation 1 to
get a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) estimate, ˆβIV1 .
In order for these ITT and LATE estimates to reflect true peer effects, the assignment indicator,
NameAdjacentijt, should not be systematically related to unobservables that cause MEP pairs to
vote more similarly.15 This raises two potential concerns. First, NameAdjacentijt is mechani-
cally correlated with the pair being in a smaller party because a larger fraction of MEP pairs are
name-adjacent in small parties.16 We will address this concern by adding party-by-parliamentary
term fixed effects as controls. Second, individuals with similar last names may have more similar
backgrounds. We will therefore introduce a flexible set of controls for name similarity.
We begin by exploring whether MEPs with alphabetically adjacent last names are more similar
in terms of predetermined characteristics. Akin to the standard approach of testing for covariate
balance in randomized trials, we can replace the left-hand side of the regression in Equation (2)
with various predetermined characteristics of the MEP pair that we observe in our data. Doing so
with and without name similarity controls allows us to assess whether MEPs with alphabetically
adjacent last names are more similar in terms of predetermined characteristics both before and
after conditioning on our controls. The six predetermined characteristics we examine are whether
the members of an MEP pair are from the same country, whether they have educations of similar
quality (as measured by an indicator for having a degree from a “top 500” university), whether they
are either both freshmen or both non-freshmen, whether they are of the same gender, their age
difference in years, and their difference in EP tenure in years.
Table 3 shows the extent to which alphabetical order predicts similarity in these predetermined
attributes. In Panel A, we provide results without controls, while Panel B includes party-by-
parliamentary term (EPG-by-EP) fixed effects and our baseline set of name similarity controls,
which include an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible measure
of the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEPs in our
data. Because observations in our data pertain to behavior by pairs of MEPs (dyads) and because
15An additional, separate concern with our empirical approach is the possibility of common shocks. Angrist (2014)
points out that even when there is exogenous variation in peer assignment, estimates of peer effects that come from
examining correlations in outcomes across peers may reflect common shocks to peer groups. In the educational peer
effects literature, a simple illustration would be, say, randomly assigned college roommates whose grades comove not
because of a peer effect but because the academic performance of both students is affected by whether or not their
neighbors play loud music late at night. Since peer groups in our setting are simply defined by where MEPs sit
during plenary sessions, common shocks would imply that sitting in a certain location directly influences how you
vote (for example, because of the angle from which you see the speaker). Correlated shocks seem unlikely to occur
in our setting. Further, they would need to be highly localized because, as we show in Appendix D, our estimated
peer effect dissipates very rapidly with seating distance.
16This mechanical correlation occurs because adding additional MEPs to a party increases the total number of
within-party pairs more than the number of pairs that are name adjacent. For example, increasing the number of
MEPs in a party from 3 to 4 will double the number of within-party pairs, from
(3
2
)
= 3 to
(4
2
)
= 6. The number of
pairs that have alphabetically adjacent names only increases by 1, however (from 2 to 3).
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seating peer effects imply that behavior can be correlated within clusters of MEPs sitting close to
each other, we use dyadic-cluster robust standard errors throughout our analysis (Cameron and
Miller (2014) and Aronow et al. (2015)). We cluster at the level of the row-by-EP-by-EPG, thus
allowing for arbitrary correlation over time in behavior and outcomes within each row of each EPG
during the two parliamentary terms we analyze. As noted in the table, there are 76 such clusters in
the main analysis sample. See Appendix A for additional details on the computation of standard
errors.
Before we turn to covariate balance, in Column (1) we present the first stage of our IV approach,
showing that alphabetical adjacency is strongly predictive of being seated together. The coefficient
on NameAdjacentijt is above 0.8 and is precisely estimated, with a standard error below 0.03 in
both panels. We next turn to the relationship between alphabetical adjacency and pre-determined
attributes. In Column (2), we see that without name similarity controls, alphabetical adjacency
is predictive of whether the pair comes from the same country, but this relationship disappears
when we condition on their party and name similarity in Panel B. As the remaining columns show,
alphabetical adjacency is not predictive of any other similarity measure — age gap, tenure gap,
freshman status, gender, and whether both went to prestigious schools — regardless of whether we
control for name similarity. Overall, we take this as evidence that the most obvious confounds of
alphabetical adjacency do not appear to be correlated with our instrument once we condition on
party and name similarity.
3.2 Estimated peer effects
We present our first set of results on peer effects in Table 4. We begin with our intent-to-treat
analysis. In Column (1), we report a specification that only includes time fixed effects.17 The point
estimate is -0.0116 and highly significant. To deal with the obvious concern that name adjacency
is correlated with party identity or simply picks up name similarity, in Column (2) we include
EPG-by-EP fixed effects and our baseline set of name similarity controls. Unsurprisingly (given the
results from Table 3), the magnitude of the coefficient drops substantially, to -0.0048.
The next three columns assess the robustness of this estimate by adding further controls. In
Column (3), we control for the similarity of each MEP pair in terms of observable predetermined
characteristics. In Columns (4) and (5), we add additional measures of name similarity to probe
whether the baseline set eliminates most of the omitted variable bias. Specifically, in Column (4) we
add other standard measures of name similarity, including cubic polynomials in the Bigram-Jaccard
and Levensthein measures of similarity as well as an indicator for whether the MEPs’ names sound
17The overall tendency for MEPs to disagree changes noticeably over time so we use time fixed effects throughout
all our specifications.
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alike according to the SoundEx algorithm.18 In Column (5), we enrich the set of controls based on
the overall name rank gap by including indicators for every possible bin of ten values (21-30, 41-50,
etc.). Across all of these specifications, the coefficient on NameAdjacentijt remains stable around
-0.0047.
Finally, in Columns (6) and (7) we present our LATE estimates, using the result from Table 3,
Column (1) to instrument for SeatNeighborsijt with NameAdjacentijt.19 In our preferred spec-
ification with just the baseline set of name similarity controls (Column (6)), the impact of being
SeatNeighborsijt on Disagreeijt is -0.0060. This implies that sitting together reduces the chance
that two MEPs from the same party differ in their vote by 0.6 percentage points. Following the
literature on persuasion (DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010)), we can convert this estimate into a
persuasion rate, which captures the fraction of MEP pairs that were induced to agree as a result of
seating proximity, and would not have done so otherwise. In Table 4 as well as those that follow, we
list the implied persuasion rates at the bottom of each table to more easily compare persuasion rates
across models. We note that the computation of persuasion rates requires that we assume mono-
tonicity, i.e., closer proximity (weakly) increases agreement. This is a non-trivial assumption, since
proximity could plausibly intensify extant disagreements as well. Since the baseline disagreement
rate among same-party MEP pairs is 8.55 percent, a 0.6 percentage point decrease in disagreement
implies a persuasion rate of 7 percent.20
As an alternative approach to thinking about the magnitude of the seat-adjacency effect, we
can compare it to the effects of other pair characteristics. Shared nationality is by far the strongest
predictor of vote concordance in our analysis, consistent with national interests serving as an im-
portant determinant of MEPs’ voting behavior (see for example Hix (2002)). Since the coefficient
on being from the same country is -0.0505, the overall effect of seating adjacency is approximately
a tenth of the effect of shared nationality.
In Column (7), we consider a specification with the full set of controls and the coefficient is
unchanged. In Appendix D, we consider whether peer effects operate at greater physical distances
18For the Bigram-Jaccard similarity measure, we create a list of all the possible pairs (bigrams) of two consecutive
characters contained in each name (e.g., the name “Joly” contains the pairs “jo”, “ol”, and “ly”). For each pair of
names, we then count the number of such character pairs that the names have in common and divide by the number
of unique pairs that are present in at least one of the names (this is referred to as a Jaccard index). The Levenshtein
distance between two names is the smallest number of characters that needs to be changed (including removing or
adding extra characters) to turn one name into the other. We convert this distance to a similarity measure by taking
the length of the longer name in the pair, subtracting the Levenshtein distance, and dividing by the length of the
longer name. This transformation implies that both Levensthein similarity and Bigram-Jaccard similiarity range
from zero to one and are equal to one only when the two names are identical.
19In both cases we include the same set of controls in both the first and second stage estimation.
20Formally, the persuasion rate is defined as the estimated “treatment” effect divided by the average number of
pairs disagreeing in the “control” group of pairs who are not seat-adjacent. However, since only a very small fraction
of MEP pairs sit adjacently in our sample (less than 2 percent), the disagreement rate among non-adjacent pairs is
indistinguishable from the overall disagreement rate.
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than immediate neighbors by comparing whether MEPs two, three, or four seats apart, or MEPs
in the same row, vote more similarly than MEPs seated further apart. We find no evidence that
seating peer effects are present beyond pairs of MEPs that are immediate neighbors. This further
helps to reinforce our interpretation that the patterns we document are peer effects based on seating
proximity, rather than some function of name similarity.21
As a further check on whether unobserved differences might be driving our results, we consider
MEP pairs from the four parties that do not sit alphabetically and the non-alphabetically seated
leaders of the otherwise alphabetically seated parties as placebo tests.22 If the ITT and LATE
estimates in our main analysis sample only reflect causal peer effects of seat proximity, we should
not see a relationship between voting similarity and alphabetical adjacency in these alternative
samples where seating is unrelated to surname.
For the sample of proposals and MEP pairs in which both MEPs are in the leadership section
of alphabetically seated parties, we define NameAdjacentijt as an indicator for whether the two
MEPs were adjacent in the ranking of surnames within their leadership section.23 In Table 5, Panel
A, we examine how alphabetical adjacency affects seating and voting among leaders.24 In the first
two columns, we show that, consistent with the non-alphabetization of leaders (and our casual
empirics in Figure 2), alphabetical adjacency does not predict whether leaders are seat neighbors.
In the next five columns, we repeat the intent-to-treat analysis from Table 4 in this alternative
sample.25 The point estimates on NameAdjacentijt are very close to zero (and in fact positive).
In each specification, we can reject the null that having alphabetically adjacent last names reduces
disagreement by more than 0.3 percentage points. In Panel B, we provide the same set of analyses
for the sample of MEP pairs from non-alphabetical parties. Again, we see little evidence that
21The layout of the European Parliament is such that front and back neighbors are distinctly further away than
side-to-side neighbors. In addition to the incremental distance, the seating across rows is tiered and separated by
sizeable desks, making physical interaction awkward. We therefore do not expect peer effects to lead to a correlation
with the votes of MEPs in the front and back of an MEP. Additionally, we have no instrument for proximity of
front-and-back MEPs.
22Data from non-alphabetical parties also illustrates the importance of our instrumental variable approach and
the pitfalls of a naive specification that simply looks at the relationship between sitting together and disagreement
without accounting for potential selection. In Table A.10, we find that in parties that do not impose alphabetical
seating, sitting together reduces agreement by 3 percentage points, an estimate that is 5 times greater than the
selection-proof LATE estimate in from out main specification.
23This definition of NameAdjacentijt exactly mirrors the one used in the main analysis sample in the sense that it
focuses on alphabetical adjacency within the given group of MEPs. Because there are fewer leaders than non-leaders
— in alphabetically seated parties, 32 percent of MEPs are leaders on average — one might be concerned that name
adjacency in the group of leaders is a weaker correlate of name similarity. In Appendix E, we therefore redo the
placebo test for the leaders while measuring name adjacency across the full EPG. This leads to similar results.
24One might worry that this is an imperfect placebo test since the voting behavior of leaders might systematically
differ from that of non-leaders. This concern is somewhat mitigated by the fact that leaders tend to disagree in their
votes roughly as much as non-leaders do (8.15 percent vs 8.55 percent).
25Note that SameNameijt drops out of our placebo analyses because no MEP pairs have identical surnames in
the placebo samples.
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alphabetical adjacency predicts voting disagreement (although we do note that estimates in this
sample are sufficiently imprecise as to allow for sizeable peer effects). The lack of any correlation
between alphabetical adjacency and voting behavior throughout Table 5 further mitigates concerns
that our results are driven by unobservable MEP pair characteristics that correlate with name
adjacency, such as socioeconomic backgrounds or regions of origin within countries.26
3.3 Contemporaneous versus persistent peer effects
Thus far, our treatment of peer effects has been entirely static in the sense that we have only
considered an effect of sitting together during a particular vote. In other words, we have focused
on contemporaneous peer effects whereby an individual is influenced by her immediate neighbor
during the actual vote. But peer effects could also be persistent if they operate through altering
peers’ deeper allegiances or beliefs and thus influence future votes when the peers are no longer
sitting next to one another. The persistent effects we document in this section also help to rule out
some of the more mechanical forms of peer effects.27
We distinguish between these two types of peer effects by exploiting the two-venue nature of
the EP. In each venue, an EPG’s members are spread across several rows. Thus, even if there were
perfect compliance with the alphabetical seating rule, there would still be some MEP pairs with
adjacent names who do not sit next to each other because the first MEP is assigned the last seat
in one row, while the second MEP is assigned the first seat of the next one. Moreover, row endings
occur at different places in the two venues (cf: Figure 1), so some alphabetically adjacent MEPs sit
next to each other in Brussels but not in Strasbourg, and vice versa. Figure 3 provides an example
of this by zooming in on rows occupied by the Greens–European Free Alliance group, that are
contained in the dashed rectangles of Figure 1. As this figure highlights, MEPs Jadot, Joly, and
Keller are alphabetically consecutive MEPs from the group during the September-October 2009
sessions. Jadot and Joly are adjacent in both the Brussels and Strasbourg sessions, whereas Joly
and Keller sit together in Strasbourg but not in Brussels, owing to a row end that separates them.
We will exploit this variation in peer exposure over time to conduct a simple test for the existence
of persistent peer effects.
Define SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt as an indicator for whether, during proposal t taking
place in some venue, the MEP pair ij sat next to each other during the most recent proposal that
did not take place in that venue. Furthermore define SeatNeighborsBothV enuesijt as an indicator
26One potential concern with the placebo tests conducted here is that name adjacency is a weaker correlate of name
similarity when we look only at the small leadership section. We address this issue in Appendix E by conducting our
placebo tests using a different measure of name adjacency and find similar results.
27This also helps to rule out the concern that the contemporaneous correlation in votes are a result of peers who
dislike one another choosing not to attend the parliament.
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for whether the MEP pair ij is seated adjacently in both the current venue and during the most
recent proposal that did not take place in that venue. That is, SeatNeighborsBothV enuesijt is
the interaction between SeatNeighborsijt and SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt. To test for the
existence of persistent peer effects, we then consider the following two specifications:
Disagreeijt = δ0 + δ1SeatNeighborsijt + δ2SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt + ξijt (3)
Disagreeijt = η0+η1SeatNeighborsijt + η2SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt (4)
+ η3SeatNeighborsBothV enuesijt + υijt.
In Equation 3, δ1 captures the effect of an MEP pair sitting next to each other during current
voting, while δ2 captures the effect of having sat together in the past. To check for persistence in
the observed peer effects, we can test whether past seating adjacency matters for current votes, i.e.,
whether δ2 = 0. As written, Equation 3 imposes that the effects of current and past seating are
additively separable. Equation 4 additionally allows for an interaction between current and past
seating. The hypothesis that past seating does not matter for current votes corresponds in this
latter expression to having a zero coefficient on both the past seating variable and its interaction
with current seating, i.e., η2 = η3 = 0.28
As before, because of possible sorting by like-minded MEPs into adjacent seats, we do not esti-
mate Equation 3 directly using OLS but use the variation in current and past seating that is gener-
ated by the interaction between the alphabetical seating rule and the changing seat layouts. Using
the layout of seats allocated to each EPG during each meeting in each of the venues, we therefore
compute the predicted seat and row for each of the MEPs in our main analysis sample, assuming per-
fect compliance with the alphabetical seating rules. From these predicted seating configurations, we
construct self-explanatory variables SeatNeighborsPredictedijt , SeatNeighborsPreviousV enuePredictedijt,
and SeatNeighborsBothV enuesPredictedijt. If the layout of seats in the two venues were the same,
these variables would be almost perfectly collinear and only differ on dates when MEPs join or leave
the non-leadership groups.29 Because of the differences in layouts across the two venues, however,
28One potential concern with the specifications is that being seat neighbors in the previous venue is correlated
with current proximity of seats even conditional on not being immediate seat neighbors. However, as we discuss in
Appendix D, contemporaneous peer effects do not extend beyond the immediate neighbor, so this is unlikely to be
an important confound.
29Such changes do occur in the data both because of MEPs dropping out of the EP and because of changes in
the size and composition of the non-leadership group over time. They are quite limited, however. The correlation in
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there is substantial independent variation in these variables so they can serve as instruments in
Equation (3).30
Table 6 presents the results that capture peer effects across venues. Throughout the table, we
focus on our preferred specification that includes time fixed effects, EPG-by-EP fixed effects, and
the baseline name similarity controls. We first present results from the specification that includes
only SeatNeighborsijt and SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt (Equation 3). Column (1) presents
reduced form estimates from regressingDisagreeijt directly on the two instruments (akin to the ITT
estimates in previous tables), while Column (2) presents 2SLS estimates in which we instrument for
SeatNeighborijt and SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt (akin to the LATE estimates in previous
tables). We find clear evidence of persistent peer effects in both sets of results. Focusing on the
2SLS estimates, the coefficient on SeatNeighborsPreviousV enue is -0.0055 and is significant at the
5 percent level (p = 0.014), allowing us to reject the hypothesis that only current seating matters.
The coefficient on SeatNeighborijt is much smaller (-0.0011) and is not statistically significant. At
the same time, however, standard errors are large enough that we cannot rule out substantial effects
of current seating or that the coefficients on SeatNeighborijt and SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt
are the same. In Columns (3) and (4), we move to the richer specification that allows current and
past seating to interact. The conclusions from this analysis are similar. Focusing again on the
2SLS estimates, we find a coefficient of -0.004 on both SeatNeighborsPreviousV enue and the
interaction term; these are jointly significant, implying that past seating matters for current voting.
The coefficient on SeatNeighborijt is again small and even slightly positive in this specification.
However, the standard errors once again do not allow us to rule out that current seating has
important independent effects or that the coefficients on all three seating variables are the same.
Thus, we find support for the view that peer effects are persistent, so that past seating proximity
matters for current voting irrespective of current seating. Unfortunately, our data does not allow
us to make precise statements about the relative importance of current versus past seating.31
The two-venue nature of the EP also provides us with additional placebo tests that examine
whether being neighbors in a future venue reduces current disagreement. Specifically, in Table
SeatNeighborsPredictedijt across two subsequent meetings in the same venue is 0.995.
30In Appendix G, we show the first stages for these instruments. All instruments are highly significant in all the
first-stage specifications. However, each of the predicted seating variables is a particularly strong predictor of its non-
predicted counterpart (i.e., SeatNeighborsPredictedijt is a particularly strong predictor of SeatNeighborsijt , while
SeatNeighborsPreviousV enuePredictedijt is a particularly strong predictor of SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt).
This ensures that we have enough independent predictive power in the three instruments to identify the separate
effects of all endogenous variables. Accordingly, the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) conditional first stage F-
statistic measures of instrument strength presented are high for all of the endogenous variables.
31In unreported results, we have examined other specifications aimed at identifying the dynamics of peer effects,
including separating votes by the time since the start of the parliamentary term or assuming that the full path of
past seating is exogenous. In no instance do we have power to produce useful bounds on how peer effects evolve over
time.
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7, we augment the specifications in Equations 3 and 4 by including the self-explanatory variables
SeatNeighborsNextV enueijt (in the OLS specification) and SeatNeighborsNextV enuePredictedijt
(in the 2SLS specification). Reassuringly, we find no significant impact of being (predicted) neigh-
bors in the next venue on current levels of disagreement.
3.4 Heterogeneity in peer effects
While the results on the persistence of peer effects in the preceding section shed some light on the
underlying mechanisms (e.g., the peer effects must involve something more than simple “parroting”
behavior), we may further enrich our understanding of mechanisms by exploring the heterogeneity
in their strength across MEP-pair and vote characteristics. We begin by examining whether seat
neighbors that share salient social characteristics (namely gender and country of origin) influence
each other more.32 Shared social characteristics might strengthen peer effects either because of the
greater deference that individuals show toward the ideas and interests of in-group members (Tajfel
(1970)) or because social connection leads to more communication and thus greater influence.33
A common country of origin is a natural source of shared culture, language, and social ties.
Moroever, existing work documents gender-specific influence in the context of job referrals (Bayer
et al. (2008)) and information flows among stock analysts (Fang and Huang (2016)). Recent news
coverage also supports the idea that women might have particularly strong influence on each other
in the male-dominanated context of parliamentary politics. Two female members of the U.S. Senate,
Barbara Murkowski and Susan Collins, sit in adjacent desks and have consistently voted together
on key legislation, in opposition to their party’s position. Further emphasizing the role of seat
proximity in accentuating their mutual influence, a New York Times column on their defiance of
the party line reported that, “[Ms. Collins and Ms. Murkowski] discussed the possibility that the
leadership might want to change their seating arrangement to keep them from being bad influences
on each other.”34
In Table 8 we split the sample by the MEP pairs’ gender mix and by whether MEPs are from the
same country, and repeat our primary specification.35 The table shows that peer effects are indeed
much greater if the MEP-pair are both women or if they come from the same country. In those
cases, sitting together reduces disagreement by 1.2-1.4 percentage points, implying a persuasion
32Table A.3 in Appendix B examines heterogeneous peer effects across the various other MEP characteristics
available to us in our data; we find no significant heterogeneity along any other dimension.
33See, in particular, Garlick (2018), which finds that peer influence in academic among South African university
students assigned to live in the same dormitory is stronger for students of the same race or enrolled in the same
program.
34See “Lisa Murkowski, a Swing Vote on Health Care, Isn’t Swayed,” New York Times, page A1, July 26, 2017.
35For completeness, Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix B show results where the sample is instead split only by
gender mix or shared country of origin.
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rate between 17 and 40 percent. It is also worth noting that the two sources of social proximity do
not have additive effects: the impact of sitting together on two female MEPs is a 1.3-1.4 percentage
point reduction in disagreement regardless of whether the MEPs are from the same country or not.
These results might suggest that for peer effects to operate, the MEP-pair needs to clear some
threshold of pre-existing social affinity.36
We next explore whether peer effects are more pronounced in high-stakes situations, by focusing
on votes for proposals that were either passed or defeated by a small margin. Table 9 repeats our
preferred specifications for samples of proposals with different win margins. Columns (1) and (2)
show ITT and LATE estimates for the sample of proposals that passed or were defeated comfortably,
as defined by a win margin of more than 10 percent. Ninety percent of our sample is comprised
of such “comfortable” votes, and thus it is unsurprising that the estimated peer effects for this
subsample are very similar to those reported in our main results. The LATE estimate in Column
(2) implies that adjacent seating lowers disagreement by 0.55 percentage points. Columns (3) and
(4) estimate peer effects in proposals that passed with a small margin of victory, defined by a win
margin of less than 10 percent. The estimated peer effects in these close votes are about twice those
found for “comfortable” votes, a difference which is marginally significant (p = 0.09 for both ITT and
LATE estimates). The next four columns show corresponding estimates for narrower win margins
of 5 and 1 percentage points respectively. These yield similar or even slightly larger estimated peer
effects. Overall, these results suggest that peer effects are stronger when vote outcomes are close.37
4 Conclusion
We exploit alphabetical seating assignments of Members of the European Parliament to identify peer
influence among politicians. Through a combination of placebo tests and detailed name similarity
controls, we bolster the interpretation that the patterns we observe are the result of peer influence
rather than unobserved commonalities among MEP pairs with alphabetically adjacent names.
We further document important heterogeneity in these effects. Peer effects are stronger for MEP
pairs that are from the same county or that are both women. These results suggest that similarity
36In Appendix F, we examine whether peer effects operate across parties, a setting in which pre-existing social
distance between MEPs is likely to be high. We do so by examining the votes of MEPs seated at row ends within
each party. We find no evidence that peer effects operate across party lines; however, confidence intervals do allow
for non-trivial peer effects across parties.
37It is possible to explore heterogeneity based on other characteristics of the proposal up for vote. In Appendix
C we examine whether the strength of peer effects differs as a function of whether MEPs’ countries are aligned in
how they vote. We find that the estimated peer effect is similar, regardless of the concordance in voting between the
MEPs from the pair’s home countries. Of course, the baseline rate of disagreement for MEP pairs is lower when the
MEPs’ countries are well-aligned, which implies that the persuasion rate is much higher for pairs for which ex ante
alignment is stronger.
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along other dimensions can serve to reinforce peer influence from direct exposure.
One useful aspect of the European Parliament as a setting for studying peer effects is its mi-
gration between two venues, Brussels and Strasbourg, with distinct seating arrangements. This
allows us to explore both contemporaneous and persistent peer effects. While limited statistical
power prevents us from drawing sharp conclusions regarding their relative magnitude, we confirm
that peer effects do have a persistent component. This suggests that peer influence extends beyond
mere parroting to impact beliefs or alliances.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Overview of samples used in the analysis
Main analysis sample: Placebo sample 1: Placebo sample 2:
Non-leaders, EPGs using EPGs not using Leaders, EPGs using
alphabetical seating alphabetical seating alphabetical seating
Frequencies:
Number of EPGs 6 4 5
Number of MEPs 857 225 320
Number of cast votes 1,820,233 456,247 680,915
MEP characteristics:
Mean age 51.07 52.97 53.67
Mean tenure in EP 3.56 3.21 6.51
Share top ranked education 0.25 0.22 0.31
Share women 0.39 0.22 0.32
The table shows counts for the various subsamples in the data, as well as means and shares of MEP
characteristics for the different subsamples. An MEP is coded as belonging to one of the three groups
if he or she is ever observed in that group. As a result, the groups overlap and table numbers do not
add up to the full sample totals. MEPs’ characteristics are measured at the time of their first observed
vote in the data. Means and shares are computed over individual MEPs.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
N mean sd min max
MEP Pair characteristics:
Same country 107,325,010 0.0782 0.2685 0 1
Same quality education 107,325,010 0.6085 0.4881 0 1
Same freshman status 107,325,010 0.5218 0.4995 0 1
Age difference (years) 107,325,010 1.1691 0.8724 0 5.5953
Tenure difference (years) 107,325,010 0.5258 0.5632 0 2.9660
Same gender 107,325,010 0.5474 0.4977 0 1
Number of women 107,325,010 0.7347 0.6907 0 2
Voting and seating:
Disagree 107,325,010 0.0855 0.2796 0 1
Name adjacent 107,325,010 0.0137 0.1163 0 1
Seat neighbors 107,325,010 0.0127 0.1119 0 1
Seat neighbors, predicted 107,325,010 0.0126 0.1117 0 1
Seat neighbors, previous venue 101,126,434 0.0124 0.1107 0 1
Seat neighbors, previous venue, predicted 101,126,434 0.0124 0.1106 0 1
Seat neighbors, both venues 101,126,434 0.0108 0.1033 0 1
Seat neighbors, both venues, predicted 101,126,434 0.0114 0.1059 0 1
Name similarity measures:
Same name 107,325,010 0.0001 0.0076 0 1
Overall name rank gap 107,325,010 416 293 1 1,258
Names sound alike 107,325,010 0.0005 0.0231 0 1
Levenshtein name similarity 107,325,010 0.1223 0.1003 0 1
Bigram-Jaccard name similarity 107,325,010 0.0379 0.0801 0 1
The table provides summary statistics for the main analysis sample. Observations are at the
level of the proposal-by-MEP-pair. Same quality education is an indicator variable denoting that
both MEPs have the same quality of education (i.e., either both or neither have high quality), as
measured by a degree from a top 500 university. Same freshman status is an indicator for whether
both MEPs have the same freshman status. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether the pair of
MEPs is immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within its seating section
(the non-leadership section of their EPG) at the time of the proposal’s vote. Seat neighbors is an
indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are seating neighbors. Seat neighbors, previous
venue is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair were seating neighbors during the
most recent meeting that took place in a different venue than the current one. Seat neighbors, both
venues is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are currently seating neighbors and
were also seating neighbors during the most recent meeting that took place in a different venue than
the current one. Names sound alike is an indicator for whether the MEPs’ surnames sound alike
according to the SoundEx-algorithm. Overall name rank gap is the distance between the MEPs’
last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in the data. All other variables
are self-explanatory. Variables with the suffix “predicted” were constructed from counterfactual
seating charts that take as given the layout of seats within the non-leadership section of each EPG
on each day but assume perfect compliance with the alphabetical seating rules within the section.
For variables involving information about the previous venue, the number of observations is lower
because these variables are undefined for the first few meetings in the data.
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Table 3: Covariate balance for alphabetically adjacent versus non-adjacent MEP pairs
Panel A - no controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Seat Same Same educ. Same freshman Same Age Tenure
neighbors country quality status gender difference difference
Name adjacent 0.8404*** 0.0236** -0.0183 -0.0047 -0.0230 -0.0138 -0.0044
(0.0201) (0.0100) (0.0141) (0.0180) (0.0204) (0.0249) (0.0104)
Constant 0.0012*** 0.0779*** 0.6088*** 0.5218*** 0.5477*** 1.1693*** 0.5258***
(0.0003) (0.0031) (0.0255) (0.0067) (0.0202) (0.0279) (0.0206)
Observations 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010
Clusters 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Panel B - baseline name similarity controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Seat Same Same educ. Same freshman Same Age Tenure
neighbors country quality status gender difference difference
Name adjacent 0.7959*** 0.0020 -0.0233 -0.0183 0.0034 -0.0282 -0.0121
(0.0257) (0.0133) (0.0229) (0.0225) (0.0242) (0.0381) (0.0173)
Same name -0.0324 0.5470*** 0.1868 0.1783 0.3620* -0.6824*** -0.4548***
(0.0618) (0.1760) (0.1594) (0.1855) (0.2022) (0.2571) (0.0786)
Overall name rank gap is 1 0.0845** 0.0342 -0.0214 -0.0399 -0.0888 0.1245 0.0683
(0.0348) (0.0356) (0.0464) (0.0513) (0.0561) (0.1075) (0.0500)
Overall name rank gap is 2-5 0.0686*** 0.0165 0.0073 0.0257 -0.0325 0.0338 0.0473
(0.0161) (0.0206) (0.0308) (0.0303) (0.0227) (0.0523) (0.0351)
Overall name rank gap is 6-10 0.0327*** 0.0211 0.0034 -0.0247 -0.0030 -0.0291 0.0327
(0.0086) (0.0153) (0.0197) (0.0176) (0.0280) (0.0503) (0.0244)
Overall name rank gap is 11-20 0.0282*** -0.0174** -0.0083 -0.0042 -0.0375*** 0.0717*** 0.0299*
(0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0116) (0.0252) (0.0160)
Overall name rank gap is 21-40 0.0048** 0.0054 -0.0169 -0.0075 -0.0076 0.0145 0.0203
(0.0019) (0.0060) (0.0145) (0.0131) (0.0103) (0.0224) (0.0146)
Overall name rank gap is 41-80 0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0143** -0.0224*** -0.0038 0.0185 0.0419***
(0.0008) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0082)
Overall name rank gap is 81-160 -0.0001 0.0012 -0.0044 -0.0199*** -0.0176 0.0127 0.0289**
(0.0003) (0.0048) (0.0100) (0.0047) (0.0111) (0.0121) (0.0132)
Overall name rank gap is 161-320 0.0001 0.0016 0.0005 -0.0225*** -0.0191 0.0123 0.0409**
(0.0002) (0.0062) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0160) (0.0192) (0.0162)
Overall name rank gap is 321-640 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0052 -0.0177** -0.0198 0.0190 0.0319***
(0.0003) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0087) (0.0160) (0.0245) (0.0091)
EP-by-EPG fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010
Clusters 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Each panel of the table presents OLS regression results. Observations are proposals-by-MEP-pairs in the main analysis sample. The outcome
variables in both panels are: an indicator for the pair sitting next to each other (Column (1)); an indicator for whether the two MEPs are
from the same country (Column (2)); an indicator for whether the two MEPs have the same education quality, i.e., either both MEPs have
or neither has a degree from a top 500 university (Column (3)); an indicator for same freshman status, i.e., either both MEPs or neither
is a freshman (Column (4)); an indicator for same gender (Column (5)); the age difference between the two MEPs (Column (6)); and the
difference in EP tenure between the two MEPs (Column (7)). In Panel A, the only regressor is an indicator for whether members of the
MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section (the non-leadership section of their
EPG). Panel B also includes EP-by-EPG fixed effects, an indicator for whether the MEP pair has the same surname and a flexible set of
indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data. Standard
errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is
listed in the bottom row of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Peer effects - main analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0116*** -0.0048** -0.0047* -0.0046* -0.0047**
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Seat neighbors -0.0060** -0.0060*
(0.0030) (0.0030)
Same quality education -0.0029** -0.0029** -0.0029** -0.0029**
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Same freshman status -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Same country -0.0505*** -0.0507*** -0.0507*** -0.0507***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Age difference 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Tenure difference 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Same gender 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
EP-by-EPG fixed No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Additional name No No No Yes Yes No Yes
similarity controls
Additional name No No No No Yes No Yes
rank gap controls
Observations 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010
Clusters 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
Implied persuasion rate 0.1357 0.0561 0.0550 0.0538 0.0550 0.0702 0.0702
F-stat 958.3 960.3
Observations in the reported regression results are proposals-by-MEP-pairs in the main analysis sample of non-leader MEPs
from alphabetical parties. The outcome variable is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on
the proposal. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair is immediately adjacent in the alphabetical
ordering of surnames within their seating section (the non-leadership section of their EPG). Seat neighbors is an indicator
for whether the MEP pair are seated adjacently. The remaining variables are self-explanatory (see Table 2 notes for detailed
definitions). "Baseline name controls" are comprised of an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a
flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last
names in our data. "Additional name similarity controls" include cubic polynomials in Bigram-Jaccard and Levensthein name
similarity as well as an indicator variable for whether the names sound alike under the SoundEx algorithm. "Additional name
rank gap controls" are indicators for every 10-seat bin in the "overall name rank gap" variable (as described in the main text).
Estimates in Columns (1)–(5) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (6) and (7) were obtained using 2SLS, using
the indicator for whether members of the MEP pair is immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within
their seating section to instrument for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently (the same sets of name similarity controls
are employed in the first-stage estimation). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level of
row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom section of the table. The persuasion
rate implied by the estimated peer effect is based on DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The listed F-statistics in the 2SLS
column correspond to the first- stage F-statistic measure of instrument strength proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Placebo test - leaders and non-alphabetical parties
Panel A - leadership sections of alphabetical parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Seat Seat Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
neighbors neighbors
Name adjacent 0.0170 -0.0111 0.0005 0.0022 0.0029 0.0026 0.0024
(0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Observations 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462
Clusters 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Panel B - non-alphabetical parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Seat Seat Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
neighbors neighbors
Name adjacent -0.0073 0.0095 0.0104 -0.0049 -0.0047 -0.0044 -0.0027
(0.0132) (0.0189) (0.0109) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0054)
Observations 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460
Clusters 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observable pair No Yes No Yes No No Yes
characteristics
Additional name No Yes No No No Yes Yes
similarity controls
Additional name No Yes No No No No Yes
rank gap controls
Observations in the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP-pairs. Panel A includes all observations
in which both MEPs are leaders of the same alphabetically seated EPG. Panel B includes all observations in
which both MEPs are from the same non-alphabetically seated EPG. The outcome variable in Columns (1) and
(2) is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently, and in Columns (3)–(7) it is an indicator for
whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. The control variables listed at the bottom are included
in the analyses of both Panels A and B. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair
are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section (the non-leadership
section of their EPG). Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently. The remaining
variables are self-explanatory (see Table 2 notes for detailed definitions). "Baseline name controls" are comprised of
an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance
between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data. "Additional name
similarity controls" include cubic polynomials in Bigram-Jaccard and Levensthein name similarity as well as an
indicator variable for whether the names sound alike under the SoundEx algorithm. "Additional name rank gap
controls" are indicators for every 10-seat bin in the "overall name rank gap" variable (as described in the main
text). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term.
The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom row of each panel. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Measuring contemporaneous versus persistent peer effects using venue variation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Seat neighbors, predicted -0.0011 -0.0005
(0.0023) (0.0042)
Seat neighbors, previous venue, predicted -0.0043*** -0.0036
(0.0016) (0.0036)
Seat neighbors, both venues, predicted -0.0015
(0.0059)
Seat neighbors -0.0009 0.0007
(0.0033) (0.0061)
Seat neighbors, previous venue -0.0055** -0.0036
(0.0025) (0.0053)
Seat neighbors, both venues -0.0037
(0.0093)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 101,126,434 101,126,434 101,126,434 101,126,434
Clusters 76 76 76 76
F-stat: Seat neighbors 221.5 104.7
F-stat: Seat neighbors, previous venue 125.3 69.16
F-stat: Seat neighbors, both venues 60.91
p-value: past seating does not matter 0.028** 0.099*
p-value: coefficients are equal 0.329 0.391 0.609 0.711
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs in the main anal-
ysis sample, excluding the dates prior to the first observed venue change, in which there is no
information about previous venue. In all columns, the outcome variable is an indicator variable
denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent is an indicator
for whether the pair of MEPs is immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames
within its seating section (the non-leadership section of their EPG) at the time of the proposal’s
vote. Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are seating neigh-
bors. Seat neighbors, previous venue is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair were
seating neighbors during the most recent meeting that took place in a different venue than the
current one. Seat neighbors, both venues is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair
are currently seating neighbors and were also seating neighbors during the most recent meeting
that took place in a different venue than the current one. In addition to day-level and EP-by-EPG
fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity controls": an indicator
for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the
distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our
data. Estimates in Columns (1) and (3) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (2) and
(4) were obtained using 2SLS, using the the predicted seating indicators as instruments for the
actual seating variables. Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the
level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom
section of the table. The listed F-statistics in the 2SLS column correspond to Sanderson and
Windmeijer (2016)’s "conditional first stage F-statistic" measures of instrument strength under
multiple endogenous variables. For Columns (3) and (4) the table shows p-values from a Wald
test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on Seat neighbors, previous venue and Seat neighbors,
both venues or their predicted versions are both zero ("past seating does not matter"). For all
columns the table shows p-values from a Wald test of the hypothesis that all listed coefficients are
the same ("coefficients are equal"). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Placebo test - the effect of future seating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Seat neighbors, next venue, predicted 0.0030 0.0027
(0.0024) (0.0023)
Seat neighbors, next venue 0.0045 0.0040
(0.0037) (0.0035)
Seat neighbors, predicted -0.0004 0.0008
(0.0021) (0.0044)
Seat neighbors, previous venue, predicted -0.0078*** -0.0064
(0.0026) (0.0040)
Seat neighbors, both venues, predicted -0.0024
(0.0061)
Seat neighbors 0.0001 0.0027
(0.0032) (0.0064)
Seat neighbors, previous venue -0.0108** -0.0077
(0.0042) (0.0060)
Seat neighbors, both venues -0.0054
(0.0096)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 86,517,817 86,517,817 86,517,817 86,517,817
Clusters 76 76 76 76
F-stat: Seat neighbors, next venue 82.48 82.71
F-stat: Seat neighbors 88.96 60.35
F-stat: Seat neighbors, previous venue 75.82 115.7
F-stat: Seat neighbors, both venues 43.17
p-value: same effect of next/previous venue 0.0213** 0.0381** 0.0998* 0.158
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs in the main analysis
sample, excluding the dates prior to the first observed venue change, in which there is no infor-
mation about previous venue, and also excluding the dates after the last venue change in which
there is no information about next venue. In all columns, the outcome variable is an indicator
variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent is
an indicator for whether the pair of MEPs is immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of
surnames within its seating section (the non-leadership section of their EPG) at the time of the
proposal’s vote. Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are seating
neighbors. Seat neighbors, previous venue is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair
were seating neighbors during the most recent meeting that took place in a different venue than the
current one. Seat neighbors, next venue is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair will
be seating neighbors during the first upcoming meeting that will take place in a different venue
than the current one. Seat neighbors, both venues is an indicator for whether members of the
MEP pair are currently seating neighbors and were also seating neighbors during the most recent
meeting that took place in a different venue than the current one. In addition to day-level and
EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity controls": an
indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture
the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in
our data. Estimates in Columns (1) and (3) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (2) and
(4) were obtained using 2SLS, using the the predicted seating indicators as instruments for the
actual seating variables. Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the
level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom
section of the table. The listed F-statistics in the 2SLS column correspond to Sanderson and
Windmeijer (2016)’s "conditional first stage F-statistic" measures of instrument strength under
multiple endogenous variables. For all columns the table shows p-values from a Wald test of the
hypothesis that the coefficients on Seat neighbors, previous venue and Seat neighbors, next venue
or their predicted versions are the same ("same effect of next/previous venue"). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Peer effects by gender mix and same country of origin
Panel A - MEPs in pair from different countries
SUBSAMPLE: Two women One woman, one man Two men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0113*** -0.0017 -0.0028
(0.0038) (0.0024) (0.0048)
Seat neighbors -0.0142*** -0.0022 -0.0035
(0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0060)
Observations 13,838,010 13,838,010 45,058,692 45,058,692 40,032,900 40,032,900
Clusters 63 63 76 76 71 71
Disagree mean 0.0796 0.0796 0.0866 0.0866 0.0963 0.0963
Implied persuasion rate 0.1420 0.1784 0.0196 0.0254 0.0291 0.0363
F-stat 224 617.6 744.3
Panel B - MEPs in pair from same country
SUBSAMPLE: Two women One woman, one man Two men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0113*** -0.0107*** -0.0099
(0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0078)
Seat neighbors -0.0131*** -0.0120*** -0.0129
(0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0103)
Day-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EP-by-EPG fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline name controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,301,556 1,301,556 3,516,470 3,516,470 3,577,382 3,577,382
Clusters 66 66 75 75 70 70
Disagree mean 0.0332 0.0332 0.0362 0.0362 0.0410 0.0410
Implied persuasion rate 0.3404 0.3946 0.2956 0.3315 0.2415 0.3146
F-stat 378.3 826.8 205.3
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs from the main analysis sample. The two
panels and the different columns correspond to different subsamples of MEP pairs. In Panel A, the sample only includes
MEP pairs from different countries. In Panel B, the sample only include MEP pairs from the same country. In Columns
(1) and (2), the sample only includes all-women MEP pairs. In Columns (3) and (4), the sample only includes mixed-
gender MEP pairs. In Columns (5) and (6), the sample only includes all-male MEP pairs. In all columns, the outcome
variable is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent is an
indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within
their seating section (the non-leadership section of their EPG). Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether the MEP pair
is seated adjacently. In addition to day-level and EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline
name similarity controls": an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators
to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data.
Estimates in Columns (1), (3), and (5) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (2), (4), and (6) were obtained using
2SLS, using the indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of
surnames within their seating section to instrument for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently (the same sets of name
similarity controls are employed in the first-stage estimation). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust,
clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom section
of the table. The persuasion rate implied by the estimated peer effect is based on DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The
listed F-statistics in the 2SLS columns correspond to the first-stage F-statistic measure of instrument strength proposed
by Stock and Yogo (2005). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.11
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Table 9: Peer effects in proposals with small margins of victory
SAMPLE: Win margin > 10 percent Win margin ≤ 10 percent Win margin ≤ 5 percent Win margin ≤ 1 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0044* -0.0085*** -0.0086*** -0.0158***
(0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0047)
Seat neighbors -0.0055* -0.0107*** -0.0108*** -0.0197***
(0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0057)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 97,082,264 97,082,264 10,242,746 10,242,746 5,233,431 5,233,431 863,769 863,769
Clusters 76 76 73 73 71 71 70 70
Disagree mean 0.0835 0.0835 0.104 0.104 0.100 0.100 0.109 0.109
Implied persuasion rate 0.0527 0.0659 0.0816 0.1027 0.0860 0.1080 0.1444 0.1801
F-stat 948.7 1032 1027 1080
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs from the main analysis sample. Different columns
correspond to different subsamples that only include proposals with win margins above or below a certain cutoff. In Columns (1) and
(2), the sample only proposals with a win margin above 10 percent. In Columns (3) and (4), the sample only includes proposals with
a win margin below 10 percent. In Columns (5) and (6), the sample only includes proposals with a win margin below 5 percent. In
Columns (7) and (8) the sample only includes proposals with a win margin below 1 percent. In all columns, the outcome variable is
an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether
members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section (the non-
leadership section of their EPG). Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently. In addition to day-level
and EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity controls": an indicator for whether the MEPs
have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical
ranking of all MEP last names in our data. Estimates in Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns
(2), (4), (6), and (8) were obtained using 2SLS, using the indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in
the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section to instrument for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently (the
same sets of name similarity controls are employed in the first-stage estimation). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-
robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom section of the
table. The persuasion rate implied by the estimated peer effect is based on DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The listed F-statistics
in the 2SLS columns correspond to the first-stage F-statistic measure of instrument strength proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.11
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Figure 1: Sample seating charts
Panel A - Strasbourg, September 14, 2009:
Panel B - Brussels, October 7, 2009:
Panel A shows a sample seating chart for the European Parliament in Strasbourg and Panel B shows a chart for
Brussels. Each number corresponds to an individual MEP, with their associated party listed around the outside of
the chart. The seats in the dashed rectangle in each chart are magnified in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: Seating and alphabetical rank
Panel A - European United Left–Nordic Green Left (a non-alphabetical party):
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Panel B - Greens–European Free Alliance group (alphabetical seating for non-leaders):
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In each panel, the horizontal axis is the seat ordering of MEPs within a political party. The vertical axis is the
alphabetical rank of MEPs’ surnames. The data are plotted for a sitting held on July 7, 2010.
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Figure 3: Variation in seating across venues
Panel A - Strasbourg, September 14, 2009, Rows 9-12, Greens–European Free Alliance group (VERTS/ALE)
S & D: VERTS/ALE: ALDE:
Row 12:
...
...
...
...
...
...
Row 11: . . . Seat 561: Seat 562: Seat 563: Seat 564: Seat 565: Seat 566: . . .
JADOT JOLY KELLER KIIL-NIELSEN LAMBERT LAMBERTS
Row 10: . . . Seat 478: Seat 479: Seat 480: Seat 481: Seat 482: . . .
GREZE HAFNER HASSI HAUSLING HAUTALA
Row 9:
...
...
...
...
...
Panel B - Brussels, October 7, 2009, Rows 12-15, Greens–European Free Alliance group (VERTS/ALE)
S & D: VERTS/ALE: ALDE:
Row 15:
...
...
...
...
...
...
Row 14: . . . Seat 603: Seat 604: Seat 605: Seat 606: Seat 607: Seat 608: . . .
KELLER KIIL-NIELSEN LAMBERT LAMBERTS LOCHBIHLER LOVIN
Row 13: . . . Seat 545: Seat 546: Seat 547: Seat 548: Seat 549: . . .
HASSI HAUSLING HAUTALA JADOT JOLY
Row 12:
...
...
...
...
...
The panels show close-ups of seating arrangements in consecutive sittings of the European Parliament that took place
in different venues. The highlighted and underlined names illustrate how the layouts of the two venues induce different
seat adjacencies for alphabetically adjacent MEPs.
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APPENDIX
A Standard error calculations
There are two main issues we confront in the correlation structure of our data. First, the existence
of seating-based peer effects (and/or effects of having similar last names) imply that behavior may
be correlated across MEPs sitting next to each other. If we define clusters based on groupings of
closely seated MEPs (such as rows), this becomes a standard clustering problem, in which voting
behavior is correlated across MEPs within each cluster. Second, our data is dyadic, so that an
observation in our data reflects the behavior of a pair of individuals during voting on a given
proposal rather than a single individual. On its own this implies a mechanical correlation across
all pairs in our data which have a member in common. Combined with the clustering issue, this
further implies that there may be a correlation across two pairs in our data as soon as one member
from each of the pairs are seated close together and belong to the same cluster.
To deal with these issues we use dyadic cluster-robust standard errors throughout (Cameron and
Miller (2014) and Aronow et al. (2015)). In standard regression notation, let xijt be the vector of
(exogenous) regressors (and instruments), let eˆijt be the regression residuals and let ρ(i, t) denote
the cluster to which MEP i belongs during a vote on proposal t. Let 1[·] denote the standard
indicator function. We then estimate the covariance matrix of our OLS or 2SLS regressions by
replacing the inner part of the standard (Huber-Eicker-White) sandwich estimator by:
∑
i,j,t
∑
i′,j′,t′
I(i, j, t; i′, j′, t′)eijtei′j′t′xijtx′i′j′t′ .
Here I(i, j, t; i′, j′, t′) is an indicator for whether any of the MEPs in the observation ijt and the
observation i′j′t′ belong to the same cluster, formally:
I(i, j, t; i′, j′, t′) ≡ 1
[
ρ(i, t) = ρ(i′, t′) ∨ ρ(j, t) = ρ(j′, t′) ∨ ρ(i, t) = ρ(j′, t′) ∨ ρ(i′, t′) = ρ(j, t)
]
.
Our implementation of the estimator closely follows the recommendations in Cameron and Miller
(2014). In particular, we apply a degree-of-freedom correction GG−1
N−1
N−k , where G is the number
of clusters, N is the total number of observations, and k is the number of estimated regression
coefficients, and use eigenvector decomposition to deal with non-positive semi-definite variance
matrices in finite samples.38
38One practical issue with the dyadic-cluster robust variance estimator is that it is not guaranteed to be positive
semi-definite in finite samples. In our analysis, there is only one specification in which the relevant part of the
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In implementing our analysis, we define a cluster to be a row-by-EP-by-EPG. One example of a
cluster in our data is thus “the 9th row of the Greens-European Free Alliance Group during the 6th
parliamentary term”. By choosing this level of clustering, we allow for arbitrary correlation within
each row of each EPG in each of the two parliamentary terms we analyze.39
B Peer effects by MEP characteristics, additional results
This section presents some additional results regarding heterogeneous peer effects. First, we revisit
heterogeneity in terms of gender mix and shared country of origin by showing results where the
sample is split either by gender mix or shared country of origin (as opposed to splitting the sample
in both dimensions at once). Tables A.1 and A.2 show the results. The conclusions are generally
similar to those presented in the main text, however, we note that we do not see much evidence of
a peer effect among MEPs not from the same country when these are treated as one group and not
split out by gender mix.
Second, we examine whether peer effects are stronger among seating neighbors who are similar
in terms of observable characteristics beyond those emphasized in the main text. For brevity, we
focus only on reduced form ITT estimates here. For a given pair characteristic Cij we obtain
heterogeneous ITT estimates from the interaction term in the following equation:
Disagreeijt = κ0 + κ1NameAdjacentijt + κ2NameAdjacent× Cij + κ3Cij + νijt. (5)
The characteristics we focus on are: whether members of the MEP pair have an education of
similar quality (as measured by an indicator for having a degree from a “top 500” university), their
age difference in years, their difference in EP tenure in years, and whether one or both members
of the pair are freshmen. Table A.3 shows the corresponding results. Throughout the table, the
coefficients on the interaction terms are small and never statistically significant. We see no evidence
that peer effects vary by any of these characteristics.
estimated covariance matrix is not positive semi-definite (Column (6) in Panel B of Table 3). Following Cameron
and Miller (2014), we simply correct this by setting negative eigenvalues to zero in the eigenvalue decomposition of
the estimated matrix.
39A practical complication arises due to differences in layouts across the two venues where the EP meets. Because
the Brussels layout spreads the MEPs out over more rows than the Strasbourg layout, many MEPs do not sit on the
same row number in both of the venues. Rather than having these MEPs switch clusters every time the EP changes
venue, we always assign all MEPs to their Strasbourg row number when calculating standard errors. More than 80
percent of the voting in our data takes place in Strasbourg. Moreover, since the rows in Strasbourg are wider, this
approach is conservative in the sense that it implies a coarser level of clustering.
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Table A.1: Peer effects by same country of origin
SAMPLE: From different countries From same country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0037 -0.0126***
(0.0024) (0.0040)
Seat neighbors -0.0046 -0.0150***
(0.0031) (0.0049)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 98,929,602 98,929,602 8,395,408 8,395,408
Clusters 76 76 76 76
Disagree mean 0.0896 0.0896 0.0378 0.0378
Implied persuasion rate 0.0413 0.0513 0.3333 0.3968
F-stat 860.4 1053
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs
from the main analysis sample. Different columns correspond to different sub-
samples of MEP pairs. In Columns (1) and (2), the sample only includes MEP
pairs from different countries. In Columns (3) and (4), the sample only in-
cludes MEP pairs from the same country. In all columns, the outcome variable
is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on
the proposal. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether members of the MEP
pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within
their seating section (the non-leadership section of their EPG). Seat neighbors
is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently. In addition
to day-level and EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following
"Baseline name similarity controls": an indicator for whether the MEPs have
the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance
between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last
names in our data. Estimates in Columns (1) and (3) were obtained via OLS.
Estimates in Columns (2) and (4) were obtained using 2SLS, using the indi-
cator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the
alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section to instrument
for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently (the same sets of name simi-
larity controls are employed in the first stage estimation). Standard errors in
parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-
by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom
section of the table. The persuasion rate implied by the estimated peer ef-
fect is based on DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The listed F-statistics in
the 2SLS columns correspond to the first-stage F-statistic measure of instru-
ment strength proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.11
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Table A.2: Peer effects by gender mix
SAMPLE: Two women One woman, one man Two men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0130*** -0.0025 -0.0034
(0.0037) (0.0025) (0.0047)
Seat neighbors -0.0162*** -0.0031 -0.0043
(0.0043) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 15,139,566 15,139,566 48,575,162 48,575,162 43,610,282 43,610,282
Clusters 68 68 76 76 71 71
Disagree mean 0.0756 0.0756 0.0830 0.0830 0.0918 0.0918
Implied persuasion rate 0.1720 0.2143 0.0301 0.0373 0.0370 0.0468
F-stat 249.5 722.5 755
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs from the main analysis
sample. Different columns correspond to different subsamples of MEP pairs. In Columns (1) and (2), the
sample only includes all-women MEP pairs. In Columns (3) and (4), the sample only includes mixed-
gender MEP pairs. In Columns (5) and (6), the sample only includes all-male MEP pairs. In all columns,
the outcome variable is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on
the proposal. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately
adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section (the non-leadership section
of their EPG). Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently. In addition
to day-level and EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity
controls": an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to
capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names
in our data. Estimates in Columns (1), (3), and (5) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (2),
(4), and (6) were obtained using 2SLS, using the indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are
immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating section to instrument
for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently (the same sets of name similarity controls are employed in
the first-stage estimation). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level
of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom section of the
table. The persuasion rate implied by the estimated peer effect is based on DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2010). The listed F-statistics in the 2SLS columns correspond to the first-stage F-statistic measure of
instrument strength proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.11
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Table A.3: Heterogeneous peer effects in other dimensions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
Name adjacent -0.0054* -0.0051** -0.0045* -0.0043
(0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0059)
Same quality education -0.0037***
(0.0013)
Name adj. X Same quality education 0.0009
(0.0027)
Age difference 0.0016
(0.0012)
Name adj. X Age difference 0.0004
(0.0014)
Tenure difference 0.0009
(0.0023)
Name adj. X Tenure difference -0.0006
(0.0019)
One freshman 0.0002
(0.0016)
Two freshmen -0.0019
(0.0035)
Name adj. X One freshman -0.0014
(0.0066)
Name adj. X Two freshmen 0.0006
(0.0049)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010 107,325,010
Clusters 76 76 76 76
p-value, significance of interaction terms 0.972
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs in the main analysis
sample. In all columns, the outcome variable is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP
pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent is an indicator for whether members of the
MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating
section (the non-leadership section of their EPG). The following variables and their interactions
with Name adjacent are added in various columns: an indicator for whether the two MEPs have
the same education quality as measured by whether both or neither MEPs have a degree from a
top 500 university, the age difference between the two MEPs, the difference in EP tenure between
the two MEPs, and indicators for whether one or both of the MEPs in the pair is a freshman.
In addition to day-level and EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline
name similarity controls": an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a
flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical
ranking of all MEP last names in our data. Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-
robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary term. The number of such clusters
is shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C Differences in peer effects by country alignment
We examine whether peer effects differ depending on whether politicians are ex ante more or less
aligned on a given proposal. On the one hand, peers who are far apart on an issue might exert a
stronger influence on each other. Alternatively, if the ex ante disagreement is too large, it might
prevent peers from influencing one another at all. To construct a measure of the ex ante position
of MEPs on a given proposal, we proxy individual MEPs’ positions by the overall position of their
home country since, as noted in Section 3.2, national interests and pressure from national parties are
an important determinant of MEPs’ voting behavior.40 To construct a proxy for national positions
on each proposal, we rely on the voting behavior of MEPs excluded from the main analysis sample
(i.e., leaders and MEPs from non-alphabetical parties).41 For each country and each proposal, we
define a country to be in favor of a given proposal if at least 90 percent of its MEPs voted in
favor of the proposal among MEPs not in the main analysis sample. Similarly, we define a country
to be against a given proposal if less than 40 percent of its MEPs voted in favor. Otherwise, we
say that a country is neutral on a given proposal. These cutoffs were chosen in order to split the
sample roughly evenly. Under these definitions, 32 percent of country-proposals are coded as in
favor, 29 percent are against, and 39 percent are neutral.42 To reduce mismeasurement, we drop
all country-proposal pairs in which the country has less than 10 participating MEPs among the
leaders and non-alphabetically seated parties.
Focusing on the subsample of MEP pairs that are from different countries, Table A.4 repeats our
main analysis depending on the country positions of the MEPs’ home countries. Since we employ
a subsample — we drop same-country MEP pairs and country-proposal pairs with too few MEPs
participating — we first show in Columns (1) and (2) that the estimated peer effects from Table 4
do not change substantially in this subsample.
The next six columns show ITT and LATE estimates of peer effects for proposals where the
MEPs’ home countries are aligned (Columns (3) and (4)), where one country is neutral but the
other is not (Columns (5) and (6)) and where the two countries are opposed (Columns (7) and
(8)). Looking across the columns the estimated peer effects are very similar, although they are
40Party affiliation is much more predictive of vote concordance than home country or any other MEP characteristic,
as evidenced by the high rate of agreement among our (within-party) MEP pairs. Because our analysis focuses on
within-party concordance, it is natural to focus on MEPs’ home country interests as a source of variation in a vote’s
importance to an MEP.
41We obtain similar results if we use the full set of MEPs to generate the proxy for national interest.
42Reassuringly, the resultant measure of country interest is a strong predictor of voting behavior in our main
analysis sample. Unconditionally, MEPs are 30.2 percentage points more likely to vote yes on a proposal if their
home country is in favor relative to if they are neutral and are 54.3 percentage points less likely to vote yes if their
home country is against rather than neutral. After controlling for party-by-proposal fixed effects, MEPs are 9.5
percentage points more likely to vote yes if their home country is in favor and 19.1 percentage points less likely to
vote yes if their home country is against.
38
only statistically significant when the countries are aligned. When it comes to the absolute peer
effect, therefore, there is little evidence that the strength of the seating peer effects varies with
home country positions.
If we focus on relative effects or persuasion rates, however, we see a different picture. Unsurpris-
ingly, for proposals in which the MEPs’ home countries are aligned, MEPs are much more likely to
agree regardless of seating. The baseline disagreement rate for these proposals is only 5.3 percent,
whereas it is much higher for other proposals. As a result, our LATE estimates imply that seating
peer effects have a persuasion rate (or relative effect) of 12 percent for proposals in which home
countries are aligned, whereas the persuasion rate is only 3.2 percent when one country is neutral
and 0.1 percent when countries are not aligned.43 To the extent that we care more about persuasion
rates, the results thus indicate that peer effects are stronger when politicians are ex ante not in too
strong disagreement with each other.
43Converted to relative effects, the confidence intervals from Columns (6) and (8) allow us to rule out persuasion
rates higher than 9.5 percent when one country is neutral and 4.9 percent when countries are opposed (note that the
large number of votes in the samples implies that the uncertainty on the baseline disagreement rate is negligible).
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Table A.4: Peer effects by home country positions
SAMPLE: Full subsample Countries aligned One country neutral Countries opposed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Name adjacent -0.0041 -0.0050*** -0.0037 -0.0063
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0101)
Seat neighbors -0.0053 -0.0064*** -0.0048 -0.0080
(0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0049) (0.0131)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 71,870,700 71,870,700 47,621,572 47,621,572 23,422,403 23,422,403 826,725 826,725
Clusters 74 74 74 74 74 74 70 70
Disagree mean 0.0919 0.0919 0.0526 0.0526 0.1510 0.1510 0.6858 0.6858
Implied persuasion rate 0.0446 0.0577 0.0951 0.1217 0.0245 0.0318 0.0092 0.0117
F-stat 648.8 601.9 709.8 443.2
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs from the main analysis sample, excluding MEP
pairs that are from the same country as well as country-by-proposal pairs where the country has too few participating MEPs to
reliably determine the national position (fewer than 10 MEPs participating among the group of leaders and alphabetically seated
parties). Columns (1) and (2) includes all such observations, while the remaining columns correspond to different subsamples
based on the configuration of home country positions. Columns (3) and (4) only include observations where the home countries’
positions are the same. Columns (5) and (6) only include observations where one home country is neutral but the other is not.
Columns (7) and (8) only include observations where one home country is against and the other is in favor. In all columns, the
outcome variable is an indicator variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent
is an indicator for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within
their seating section (the non-leadership section of their EPG). Seat neighbors is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated
adjacently. In addition to day-level and EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity
controls": an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance
between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data. Estimates in Columns (1), (3),
(5), and (7) were obtained via OLS. Estimates in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) were obtained using 2SLS, using the indicator
for whether members of the MEP pair are immediately adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their seating
section to instrument for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently (the same sets of name similarity controls are employed in
the first-stage estimation). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-
parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom section of the table. The persuasion rate implied by the
estimated peer effect is based on DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The listed F-statistics in the 2SLS columns correspond to
the first-stage F-statistic measure of instrument strength proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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D Peer effects at longer distances
Throughout the main text, we estimate seating peer effects only between immediate seat neigh-
bors. However, peer effects could, in principle, also operate between MEPs sitting further apart.
We can define indicator variables to denote whether two MEPs are sitting 2, 3 or 4 seats apart
(Seated2Apartijt, Seated3Apartijt, Seated4Apartijt). To test for the existence of more distant
peer effects, we consider regressions of the following form:
Disagreeijt = pi0 + pi1SeatNeighborsijt + pi2Seated2Apartijt + pi3Seated3Apartijt
+pi4Seated4Apartijt + ςijt. (6)
As in our main analysis, we use an IV strategy to deal with the sorting of MEPs and use as
instruments a set of indicators for whether the MEPs are 2, 3, or 4 apart in the alphabetical ranking
of last names within their section (Names2Apartijt, Names3Apartijt, Names4Apartijt).
Table A.5 shows the estimated peer effects when we include indicators for sitting 1, 2, 3, or 4
seats apart. Columns (1)–(4) present reduced form OLS estimates in which we simply replace the
endogenous variables by the relevant instruments, while Columns (5)–(8) present 2SLS estimates.
In both sets of columns the estimated effect of being immediate neighbors is virtually unchanged
from the specification in the main text, while the estimated effects of being 2, 3, or 4 apart are very
close to zero and in fact positive. Because standard errors increase when we include the additional
variables, however, none of the estimated effects are statistically significant on their own when we
include more than one seating variable. As shown at the bottom of the table, however, the seating
variables are jointly significant in all specifications, and we can always reject that being immediate
neighbors has the same effect as being more distant neighbors.44 Overall, we conclude that peer
effects operate only among immediate neighbors.
44Intuitively, the reason that the coefficient on being immediate neighbors is not significant on its own is that we
cannot rule out the (somewhat pathological) case where there are no peer effects among immediate neighbors but
are large peer effects among more distant neighbors.
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E Alternative placebo test
In conducting our placebo test on the sample of EPG leaders in Panel A of Table 5 we defined name
adjacency in terms of whether a pair of leadership MEPs were adjacent in the alphabetical ranking
of names within their group of leaders. This definition of NameAdjacentijt exactly mirrors the
one used in the main analysis sample in the sense that it focuses on alphabetical adjacency within
the group of MEPs who are sitting together (leaders or non-leaders). Because there are markedly
fewer leaders than non-leaders, however, one might be concerned that name adjacency in the group
of leaders is a weaker correlate of name similarity. To see why this is so, consider the extreme case
in which there are only two MEPs in the leadership group of some EPG. These two MEPs will be
name adjacent regardless how similar their surnames actually are. Conversely, if the size of a group
of MEPs tends to infinity, a pair of MEPs will be name adjacent within that group only if their
surnames are virtually identical.
To check whether such differences in group size affect the conclusions of our placebo test, Table
A.6 repeats the placebo test from Panel A of Table A.6 using a different measure of name adjacency.
Instead of defining a pair of leaders as being name adjacent if they are next to each other in the
alphabetical ordering of leaders, we define them as being name adjacent only if they are next to
each other in the alphabetical ordering of all MEPs within their EPG. Results are very similar
to those presented in the main text. The alternative measure of name adjacency does not predict
seating and also does not correlate with voting similarity. In all specifications, we can reject that
name similarity reduces disagreement by more than 0.6 percentage points.
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Table A.6: Leadership placebo test, alternative name adjacency definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Seat Seat Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
neighbors neighbors
Name adjacent, full party 0.0393 0.0013 0.0005 0.0044 0.0042 0.0038 0.0036
(0.0279) (0.0322) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0047)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observable pair No Yes No Yes No No Yes
characteristics
Additional name No Yes No No No Yes Yes
similarity controls
Additional name No Yes No No No No Yes
rank gap controls
Observations 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462 18,772,462
Clusters 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
Observations in the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs. The regressions include all observations
in which both MEPs are leaders of the same alphabetically seated EPG. The outcome variable in Columns (1) and (2)
is an indicator for whether the MEP pair is seated adjacently, and in Columns (3)–(7) it is an indicator for whether the
MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Name adjacent, full party denotes whether the MEP pair is immediately
adjacent in the alphabetical ordering of surnames within their EPG. "Baseline name controls" are comprised of an
indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between
the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data. "Observable pair characteristics"
include controls for whether the two MEPs are from the same country, have the same education quality, have the same
freshman status, their age difference, and their difference in EP tenure. "Additional name similarity controls" include
the cubic polynomials in Bigram-Jaccard and Levensthein name similarity, as well as the indicator variable for whether
the names sound alike under the SoundEX algorithm. "Additional name rank gap controls" are indicators for every
10-seat bin in the "overall name rank gap" variable (as described in the main text). Standard errors in parentheses
are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary term. The number of such clusters is
shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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F Peer effects across parties
In the main text, we estimate peer effects among MEPs from the same party. Peer effects could also
operate across party lines, however. Although our empirical strategy leverages random assignment
of seats within EPGs, we can adapt our data and specification to examine whether we see evidence
of seating peer effects across EPGs as well. In particular, there are MEPs in our data who are
assigned to seats at the edge of their EPGs’ sections and hence will be seated next to MEPs from
other parties.
To examine cross-party peer effects, we take the sample of non-leadership MEPs from alpha-
betically seated EPGs and form all possible pairs of MEPs and proposals in which both MEPs are
present and participate in the vote, and where the two MEPs are from different EPGs. Letting ij
index MEP pairs and t index proposal, we define the variables Disagreeijt and SeatNeighborsijt
as in the main analysis and consider the following regression:
Disagreeijt = ψ0 + ψ1SeatNeighborsijt + ιijt. (7)
The coefficient ψ1 measures whether MEPs from different parties who sit next to each other are
less likely to disagree, relative to MEP pairs from different parties who do not sit adjacently. To deal
with systematic sorting into seats, we instrument SeatNeighborsijt by predicted adjacency based
only on the alphabetical name rankings and seat layouts for each EPG and each day. In addition,
to address possible differences in typical agreement across EPGs we include party-pair-by-EP-term
fixed effects, as well as our baseline set of name controls. Table A.7 shows the results. Column
(1) shows the first stage regression for the predicted seating instrument, Columns (2) shows the
reduced form (ITT) estimate, and Column (3) shows LATE estimates using 2SLS. The estimates
show little indication that peer effects operate across parties, as both the ITT and LATE estimates
are in fact positive. Because standard errors are also quite large, however, our results do not rule
out that cross-party peer effects may be non-trivial. For the LATE estimate in Column (3), the 95
percent confidence interval does not allow us to reject the possibility that seat adjacency reduces
disagreement by 1.1 percentage points, corresponding to a persuasion rate of 3.6 percent. This lack
of precision reflects the relative rarity of MEPs that sit on the edge of their parties’ sections (0.02
percent of the sample) and the relatively low predictability of alphabetical seating on cross-party
adjacency (since a single out-of-order MEP affects the ordering of all row-end MEPs).
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Table A.7: Peer effects across parties
(1) (2) (3)
Seat neighbors Disagree Disagree
OLS OLS 2SLS
Seat neighbors, predicted 0.2796*** 0.0023
(0.0455) (0.0028)
Seat neighbors 0.0082
(0.0098)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG-pair Yes Yes Yes
fixed effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 212,057,965 212,057,965 212,057,965
Clusters 76 76 76
Disagree mean 0.307 0.307
F-stat 104.7
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP
pairs. The sample only includes MEP pairs who are from two different
alphabetically seated parties and where both MEPs are non-leaders.
The outcome variable in Columns (1) is an indicator for whether the
MEP pair is seated adjacently. In Columns (3) and (4), the outcome
variable is an indicator denoting whether the MEP pair cast different
votes on the proposal. The listed regressors are indicators for whether
the MEP pair is seat neighbors and for whether the MEP pair is pre-
dicted to be seat neighbors. Predicted seating refers to what would
have occurred if there had been perfect compliance with the alphabet-
ical seating rule. In addition to day-level and EP-by-EPG-pair fixed
effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity con-
trols": an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and
a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’
last names in the alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our
data. Estimates in Columns (1) and (2) were obtained via OLS. Esti-
mates in Column (3) were obtained using 2SLS, using the the predicted
seat neighbor indicator as instruments for the actual seat neighbor vari-
able. Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clus-
tered at the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number
of such clusters is listed in the bottom section of the table. The listed
F-statistics in the 2SLS column correspond to Sanderson and Windmei-
jer (2016)’s "conditional first stage F-statistic" measures of instrument
strength under multiple endogenous variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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G First stage regressions when exploiting venue variation
Table A.8 shows the first-stage regressions corresponding to Table 6. We note that all of the
predicted seating variables have predictive power in all of the first-stage specifications. At the
same time, however, each of the predicted seating variables is a particularly strong predictor of
its non-predicted counterpart (i.e., SeatNeighborsPredictedijt is a particularly strong predictor of
SeatNeighborsijt, while SeatNeighborsPreviousV enuePredictedijt is a particularly strong predic-
tor of SeatNeighborsPreviousV enueijt). This ensures that we have enough independent variation
in the instruments to estimate the effect of each of the three seating variables. In Table 7 we see
that the same is true for the first stages corresponding to Table 7. Accordingly, the Sanderson and
Windmeijer (2016) conditional first stage F-statistic measures of instrument strength shown at the
bottom of Tables 6 and 7 are high for all of the endogenous variables.
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Table A.8: First stage regressions for Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Seat neighbors Seat neighbors Seat neighbors Seat neighbors Seat neighbors
previous venue previous venue both venues
Seat neighbors, predicted 0.7229*** 0.0867*** 0.7841*** 0.1420*** 0.1398***
(0.0448) (0.0241) (0.0460) (0.0370) (0.0346)
Seat neighbors, previous venue, predicted 0.1474*** 0.7679*** 0.2209*** 0.8342*** 0.2012***
(0.0296) (0.0365) (0.0510) (0.0404) (0.0484)
Seat neighbors, both venues, predicted -0.1384** -0.1251** 0.4869***
(0.0611) (0.0503) (0.0916)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
EP-by-EPG fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Observations 101,126,434 101,126,434 101,126,434 101,126,434 101,126,434
Clusters 76 76 76 76 76
Observations for the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP pairs in the main analysis sample, excluding the dates
prior to the first observed venue change, for which there is no information about the previous venue. In Columns (1) and (3) the
outcome variable is an indicator for whether the MEP pair are seat neighbors during the current meeting. In Columns (2) and
(4) the outcome variable is an indicator for whether the MEP pair were seat neighbors during the most recent meeting that took
place in a different venue than the current one. In Column (5) the outcome variable is an indicator for whether the MEP pair
are currently seat neighbors and were also seat neighbors during the most recent meeting that took place in a different venue
than the current one. The listed regressors are indicators for whether the MEP pair is predicted to be seat neighbors currently,
whether the MEP pair is predicted to have been seat neighbors during the most recent meeting that took place in a different
venue than the current one, and whether the MEP pair is predicted to both be seat neighbors currently and to have been seat
neighbors during the most recent meeting that took place in a different venue than the current one. Predicted seating refers to
what would have occurred if there had been perfect compliance with the alphabetical seating rule. In addition to day-level and
EP-by-EPG fixed effects, all columns include the following "Baseline name similarity controls": an indicator for whether the
MEPs have the same last name and a flexible set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the
alphabetical ranking of all MEP last names in our data. Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, clustered at
the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the bottom section of the table. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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H Estimated peer effects if sorting is ignored
To shed light on the bias that would occur if we estimated peer effects without our source of
exogenous variation in seating, we examine vote congruence as a function of seat adjacency in the
sample of parties that do not use alphabetical seating. Using data on votes by MEP pairs from
these parties, Table A.10 shows results from a “naive” version of our main specification that directly
regresses MEP-pair vote disagreement on an indicator for being seat neighbors. The results suggest
a strong upward bias in estimating peer effects if one fails to account for endogenous seat selection,
as the estimated effects are much larger than those we obtain in our main analysis: adjacent MEPs
in these non-alphabetical parties are between 3 and 8 percentage points less likely to disagree
depending on the specification, corresponding to persuasion rates of between 19 and 51 percent.
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Table A.10: Estimated peer effects without accounting for sorting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Seat neighbors -0.0551*** -0.0790*** -0.0296*** -0.0295*** -0.0301***
(0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0052)
Same quality education -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.0100
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Same freshman status 0.0011 0.0013 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Same country -0.1446 -0.1433 -0.1449
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age difference 0.0019 0.0019 0.0020
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tenure difference -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0060
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Same gender 0.0010 0.0013 -0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Day-level fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Baseline name No Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
EP-by-EPG fixed No Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Additional name No No No Yes Yes
similarity controls
Additional name No No No No Yes
rank gap controls
Observations 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460 4,917,460
Clusters 49 49 49 49 49
Disagree mean 0.1547 0.1547 0.1547 0.1547 0.1547
Implied persuasion rate 0.3560 0.5107 0.1913 0.1907 0.1946
Observations in the presented regression results are proposals-by-MEP-pairs in which both
MEPs are from the same non-alphabetically seated EPG. The outcome variable is an indicator
variable denoting whether the MEP pair cast different votes on the proposal. Seat neighbors
is an indicator for whether the MEP pair are seated adjacently. The remaining variables
are self-explanatory (see Table 2 notes for detailed definitions). "Baseline name controls"
are comprised of an indicator for whether the MEPs have the same last name and a flexible
set of indicators to capture the distance between the MEPs’ last names in the alphabetical
ranking of all MEP last names in our data. "Additional name similarity controls" include
cubic polynomials in Bigram-Jaccard and Levensthein name similarity as well as an indicator
variable for whether the names sound alike under the SoundEx algorithm. "Additional name
rank gap controls" are indicators for every 10-seat bin in the "overall name rank gap" variable
(as described in the main text). Standard errors in parentheses are dyadic cluster-robust, at
the level of row-by-EPG-by-parliamentary-term. The number of such clusters is listed in the
bottom row of each panel. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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